DISTINGUISHING A TERRORIST ACT FROM SABOTAGE UNDER CONDITIONS OF ARMED AGGRESSION: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ASPECTS

Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive study of the problem of distinguishing a terrorist act from sabotage under the conditions of armed aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes one of the most challenging issues of contemporary criminal law qualification. The study examines the provisions of Articles 113 and 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, modern doctrinal approaches, and the recent case law of the Supreme Court of Ukraine concerning the legal qualification of the relevant criminal offenses. It is substantiated that the formal similarity of the objective element cannot be regarded as the decisive qualification criterion, since the same act – in particular, the destruction of transport infrastructure or arson of an energy facility – may constitute either sabotage or a terrorist act depending on the established purpose and legal consequences. Particular attention is paid to the functional and teleological approach to distinguishing related criminal offenses. It is argued that the key criterion lies in the special purpose of the act: for a terrorist act, this includes intimidation of the population, influencing state authorities, and destabilizing the social situation; for sabotage, weakening the state, undermining defense capability, and disrupting strategic infrastructure. The article proposes a comprehensive three-component test for differentiation, covering the direct object of encroachment, the special purpose, and the dominant criminal-law effect. The possibility of an ideal concurrence of elements of sabotage and terrorist act in the context of armed conflict is also substantiated.
The findings are of both theoretical and practical significance for ensuring consistency in law enforcement, improving pre-trial investigation methodology, and developing stable judicial practice.